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I. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The most significant development in the field of appellate practice in
Florida during the 1992-93 year was the revision of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
As is the case with each set of Florida court rules, such revisions occur
every four years pursuant to the cycle established by Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.130(c). Proposals are submitted by the Florida Appellate
Court Rules Committee ("the Committee") to the Supreme Court of Florida,
which adopts such portions of the proposals as it deems appropriate. The
numerous changes that resulted from this process were adopted by the
supreme court on October 22, 1992,' and took effect on January 1, 1993.2
A. Gender-Neutral Language and Compliance With Supreme
Court Style Guidelines
The rules were rewritten in gender-neutral language and in confor-
mance with the standard style guidelines promulgated by the supreme court
for court rules. Whenever possible, the rules employed the use of plural
instead of' singular pronouns to avoid both gender-specific language and
awkwardness. This is the approach that was suggested by the supreme
court3 and by the report of the court's Gender Study Bias Commission.4
I. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 609 So. 2d 516, 516
(Fla. 1992) [hereinafter Appellate Amendments].
2. Id. at 518.
3. See In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rule 3.133(b)(6) (Pretrial
Release), 573 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 1991).
4. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMM'N, REPORT OF THE FLA.
SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMM'N 239 (March 1990) (on file at Nova
1993]
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Changes for these purposes were made throughout the rules and will not be
detailed in this article. No substantive effect was intended by these changes.
B. Rule 9.010. Effective Date and Scope
This rule was amended to eliminate the statement that the appellate
rules supersede all conflicting rules. The Committee noted that other sets
of Florida court rules contain provisions applicable to certain appellate
proceedings.5 The Committee felt that, in the absence of a clear mandate
from the supreme court that only the appellate rules are to address appellate
concerns, the appellate rules should not automatically control in the event
of a conflict.6 The portion of the rule indicating that the appellate rules
supersede all conflicting statutes was unchanged.7
C. Rule 9.020. Definitions
A change of terminology in subdivision (a) of this rule reflects the fact
that workers' compensation matters are now heard by judges of compensa-
tion claims, rather than deputy commissioners.' Similar references are
changed in other rules, but will not be specifically noted in this article.
The court also adopted an extensive rewrite of subdivision (g) of the
rule, relating to rendition of orders.9  The provision was expanded to
include motions for clarification among those motions that delay rendition °
when they are timely and authorized. The provision was also rewritten to
make clear that when a rule of procedure specifically provides that a
particular motion does not delay rendition, that rule prevails and even a
timely and authorized motion that would otherwise delay rendition will not
have that effect." This change recognizes the fact that in such instances
University Law Library).
5. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.132(c)(4); FLA. W.C.R.P. 4.160.
6. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendments; Appellate Amendments,
609 So. 2d at 521.
7. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 520.
8. FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendment; Appellate Amendments,
609 So. 2d at 521.
9. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 521.
10. Rendition of an order can be postponed only when a motion, whether it be for
clarification or for some other form of relief specified by the rule, is timely and authorized
by the rules of procedure governing the proceeding in which the final order is entered. See
Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1986).
I1. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 521.
[Vol. 18
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the supreme court has indicated that the rule dealing with the specific
motion in question prevails over the general appellate rule.' 2
Subdivisions (g)(1), (g)(2) and (g)(3) replace previous language that
simply stated that when an appropriate motion was filed, an order would not
be deemed rendered until the disposition of the motion.' 3
Subdivision (g)(l) reflects that in multiple party cases, the rendition of
an order is delayed only with respect to any claim between a movant and
the party or parties against whom relief is sought by motion. 4 This
change incorporates existing case law.'5 It does not affect cases with just
one plaintiff and one defendant, as the filing of an appropriate motion in
such cases postpones rendition of the entire final order as to all claims
between the parties.' 6
Subdivision (g)(2) was added to make clear that an order granting a
new trial shall be deemed rendered when filed with the clerk even if other
motions remain pending at the time.' 7 This change also incorporates
existing case law'" and is intended to insure that subdivision (g)(1) is not
read as a modification of this principle.'9
Subdivision (g)(3) provides that if a notice of appeal is filed before the
filing of a signed, written order disposing of all motions, all motions filed
by the appealing party that are pending at the time shall be deemed
abandoned and the final order shall be deemed rendered upon the filing of
the notice of appeal as to all claims between parties who then have no
motion pending between them. ° This provision was added to clarify
confusion generated by dicta in Williams v. State,2' which appeared
contrary to the settled principle that the rule incorporates.22 Even when
one party files a notice of appeal, however, the order appealed from is still
12. In re E.P., 544 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 1989).
13. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2M at 521-22.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ostrer, 442 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
16. FLA. R. App. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendment; Appellate Amendments,
609 So. 2d at 523.
17. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 522.
18. Frazier v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 508 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 1987).
19. FLA. RULE R. App. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
20. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 522.
21. 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1975).
22. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of $104,591 in U.S. Currency, 578 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1993]
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not deemed rendered with regard to any other party whose post-judgment
motions are still pending.23
D. Rule 9.030. Jurisdiction of Courts
Subdivision (c)(1)(B) of this rule was amended to correctly indicate
that the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts extends to all non-final orders
listed in Rule 9.130,4 not just those set forth in subdivision (a)(3) of that
rule, as the rule had previously stated.
Subdivision (c)(I)(C) was amended to include thejurisdiction conferred
on circuit courts by article V, section 5 of the Florida Constitution,2 5 which
provides for "the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed
by general law."
E. Rule 9.040. General Provisions
Subdivision (h) was amended to provide that the failure to file
conformed copies of orders designated in notices of appeal, as required by
Rules 9.110(d), 9.130(c) and 9.160(c), is not a jurisdictional defect, but that
such failure may be the subject of appropriate sanctions.2 6
F. Rule 9.100. Original Proceedings
There were two additions to subdivision (b) of this rule. One change
is to prohibit the practice of bringing original proceedings to enforce a
private right on the relation of the state." Thus, such actions must now
be brought in the name of the parties. 8 The other change requires that if
a petition seeks review of an order entered by a lower tribunal, all parties
to the proceeding in the lower tribunal who are not named as petitioners
shall be named as respondents.29 This change complies with the definitions
set forth in Rule 9.020 (f)(3) and (4), which defines "[p]etitioner" as "[a]
party who seeks an order under Rule 9. 100 or Rule 9.120," and "[r]espon-
dent" as "[e]very other party in a proceeding brought by a petitioner."3
23. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendments.
24. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 525.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 529.
27. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 521.
[Vol. 18
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Subdivision (c) was substantially rewritten. Although it retains the
substance of its previous text, two significant changes were incorporated.
It now states in subdivision (c)(2) that petitions for review of final quasi-
judicial actions of agencies, boards and commissions of local government
must be filed within thirty days of the rendition of the order to be reviewed,
the same time limit that is set forth in subdivisions (c)(1) and (3) for tile
filing of petitions for common law certiorari and petitions for review of non-
final administrative actions.3 It also prohibits the practice of naming as
separate respondents to petitions filed under the rule lower court judges,
individual members of agencies, boards and commissions of local govern-
ments, and hearing officers. 32 It continues the practice of requiring copies
of petitions to be served on such individuals, however.33 The purpose of
tile change is to eliminate any suggestion that these individuals are parties
or that they are adverse to the petitioner.34
Subdivision (e) was amended to require that the caption of a petition
designate all parties on each side,35 rather than at least one party on each
side, as had previously been tile case. In addition, a requirement was added
for petitions seeking orders directed to lower tribunals to contain references
to the appropriate pages of the supporting appendix required by Rule
9.220.36 This requirement was intended to mirror the requirement of Rule
9.210(b)(3), which calls for page references to records or transcripts in
briefs. 7
Subdivision (f) was amended to reflect the existing requirement in the
law 38 that a petition for certiorari under this rule must demonstrate not only
that there has been a departure from the essential requirements of law, but
also that the departure will cause material injury for which there is no
adequate remedy by appeal.39 Previously tile rule referred only to the need
31. Id. at 531.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. FLA. R. App. P1. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
35. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 534.
36. Id.
37. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
38. All 'Weather Control, Inc. v. Wawerczyk, 600 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 590 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Young,
Stem & Tannenbaum. P.A. v. Smith, 416 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In re
J.S., 404 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), dismissed, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1982);
Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 397 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 1981), review denied, 454 U.S. 815 (1981).
39. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 531.
19931
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.,to show a departure from the essential requirements of law and the
Committee felt that it therefore established a standard other than that
established by decisional law."
Subdivision (h) was amended to extend to responses the requirement
adopted for petitions 4' that appropriate page references to appendices be
included. 2
G. Rule 9.110. Appeal Proceedings to Review Final Orders of
Lower Tribunals and Orders Granting New Trial in Jury and
Non-Jury Cases
Subdivision (d) was amended to impose a requirement that, except in
criminal cases, conformed copies of orders designated in notices of appeal
be attached to such notices.43 Copies of orders entered on timely motions
postponing rendition of orders from which appeals are taken must also be
attached.44 These requirements are for the purpose of assisting the clerk
in determining the nature and type of orders being appealed and the
timeliness of appeals, 45 and are not jurisdictional in nature. 46
Subdivision (m) was created to deal with situations in which notices of
appeal are filed before the rendition of final orders. The subdivision
provides that in such situations, appeals shall be subject to dismissal as
premature,47 but that if a final order is rendered before dismissal of the
premature appeal, the premature notice of appeal will be considered
effective to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court to review the final
order.48 It goes on to provide that before dismissal, the court, in its
discretion, may permit the lower tribunal to render a final order. 49 This
rule would not apply to situations in which the only reason a final order has
not been rendered is the pendency of a motion delaying rendition that was
filed by the same party that filed the notice of appeal. In such a situation,
the pending motion would be deemed abandoned.5
40. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
41. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(e).
42. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 532.
43. Id. at 535.
44. Id.
45. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
46. See supra part I.E.
47. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 535.
48. Id. at 535-36.
49. Id. at 536.
50. See supra part I.B.
[Vol. 1 8
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H. Rule 9.120. Discretionary Proceedings to Review Decisions of
District Courts of Appeal
An amendment to subdivision (d) makes clear that the formal
requirements for briefs specified in Rule 9.210 also apply to briefs on
jurisdiction.5
I. Rule 9.130. Proceedings to ReviewWon-Final Orders
This rule was amended to expand the list of non-final orders that may
be reviewed. Specifically, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(vii) adds orders that
determine that a class should be certified,52 subdivision (a)(6) adds orders
that deny a motion to certify a class and subdivision (a)(3)(D) adds orders
that grant or deny the appointment of a receiver,53 and terminate or refuse
to terminate a receivership.54
The provisions allowing review from orders relating to the grant or
denial of class certification arose from the Committee's belief that such
orders determine the nature of an action and the extent of the parties and are
analogous to other orders reviewable under the rule.55 These provisions
have been held to apply to orders entered after January 1, 1993, and are
therefore not limited just to orders in cases instituted after that date.56
The provision relating to receivers and receiverships was added in
response to the decision in Twinjay Chambers Partnership v. Suarez,57 in
which the court found that an order denying a request to appoint a receiver
was not appealable under subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii), which allows appeals
from orders that determine the right to immediate possession of property.5"
The court suggested that the Committee consider whether subdivision
(a)(3)(C)(ii) should be amended to set out whether and to what extent orders
granting or denying such requests should be appealable. 59 The Committee
was of the opinion that orders terminating or refusing to terminate
receiverships are of the same quality as those that grant or deny the
51. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 538.
52. Id. at 542.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
56. See Backus v. Broward County, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2075 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1993).
57. 556 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
58. Id. at 782.
59. Id.
19931
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appointment of receivers and that, rather than amending subdivision
(a)(3)(C)(ii), it was preferable to create a new provision that specifically
identifies those orders with respect to a receivership that are subject to
review under this rule.6"
In this regard, it should be noted that in a case wholly independent of
the four-year cycle revisions, the supreme court adopted an amendment that
also added a category of orders that may be reviewed. In Mandico v. Taos
Construction, Inc.,61 the court adopted subdivision (a)(3)(C)(vi), which
allows for review of orders determining that a party is not entitled to
workers' compensation immunity as a matter of law.62 That amendment
became effective upon release of the court's opinion63 on July 9, 1992.64
Subdivision (c) was also amended to impose a requirement that, except
in criminal cases, conformed copies of orders designated in notices of appeal
of non-final orders shall be attached to the notice.65 This requirement is
consistent with the identical requirement added to Rule 9.1 10(d), dealing
with notices of appeal to review final orders, and is clearly for the same
purpose.66 The requirement is not jurisdictional in nature.67
J. Rule 9.140. Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases
Subdivision (b)(3)(A)(v) was added to provide that when an appeal is
taken in a criminal proceeding, the attorneys of record shall not be relieved
of any professional duties until substitute counsel has been obtained or
appointed, or a statement has been filed with the appellate court that the
appellant has exercised the right to self-representation. 6' The provision
also states that in public-funded cases, the public defender for the local
circuit shall initially be appointed until the record is transmitted to the appel-
late court.69
Subdivision (g) was amended to apply the procedure in effect for
appeals from summary denials of motions for post-conviction relief under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, to appeals from summary denials
60. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
61. 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992).
62. Id. at 855.
63. Id
64. Id. at 850.
65. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 542.
66. See supra part I.G.
67. See supra part I.E.
68. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 545.
69. Id.
[Vol. 18
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of motions for correction of sentences under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a).7" The provision was also changed to require the clerk
of the lower tribunal to include in the record, on an appeal from the
summary denial of a Rule 3.800(a) motion, any attachments to the motion,
order, motion for rehearing and order thereon.7 This requirement was
added because a motion under Rule 3.800(a) does not have the same
detailed requirements as one under Rule 3.850.72 A proposal by the
Committee that would have eliminated briefs, except by court permission,
in appeals from motions under both of the criminal rules, was rejected by
the court. 7"
K. Rule 9.160. Discretionary Proceedings to Review Decisions of
County Courts
Subdivision (c) was amended to impose a requirement that, except in
criminal cases, conformed copies of orders designated in notices invoking
the discretionary jurisdiction of district courts of appeal to review county
court orders be attached to such notices.74 Copies of orders entered on
timely motions postponing rendition of orders from which review is sought
must also be attached.75 These requirements are consistent with the
identical requirements added to Rule 9.110(d), dealing with notices of
appeal from final orders, and are clearly for the same purpose.76 The
requirements are not jurisdictional in nature.77
L. Rule 9.200. The Record
Subdivision (b)(2) was amended to require the court reporter to bind
the transcript of proceedings in consecutively numbered volumes and to
number each page consecutively.78
70. Id. at 546.
71. Id.
72. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
73. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 517.
74. Id. at 550.
75. Id.
76. See supra part I.G.
77. See supra part I.E.
78. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 552.
1993]
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Subdivision (d)(1)(A) was amended to require the clerk to incorporate
the trial transcript at the end of the record and to prohibit the clerk from
renumbering that transcript. 79
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) was amended to include any transcripts other
than the trial transcript as part of the remainder of the record that is to be
consecutively numbered."0
These changes were made to standardize the lower court clerk's
procedure with respect to the placement and pagination of the transcript in
the record on appeal.8"
M. Rule 9.210. Briefs
Significant additions were made to subdivision (a)(2) with regard to the
type, size and spacing required for briefs. The provision requires that the
text be printed in type of no more than ten characters per inch and that text
should be double spaced with no more than twenty-seven lines per page.1
2
It further states that, although footnotes may be single spaced, they shall be
in the same type size, with the same spacing between the characters, as the
text. 3
These requirements were imposed to bring about uniformity, to
preclude efforts to circumvent the length requirements for briefs established
by subdivision (a)(5) by the use of smaller type and to eliminate the filing
of briefs that are difficult to read because of small type and spacing.84 It
appears that modern technology brought about these changes, as the
Committee took into account the fact that "[t]hrough the utilization of
various word processing systems, lawyers, if they choose, can reduce the
size of print and spacing in footnotes and significantly extend the allowable
length of their briefs, while at the same time making the ultimate product
more difficult to read. 85
Subdivision (g) was amended to allow for the filing of notices of
supplemental authority that call the court's attention not just to decisions,
rules or statutes, but also to other authorities."s A provision was also
added allowing the notice to identify briefly the points argued on appeal to
79. Id. at 553.
80. Id.
81. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
82. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 556.
83. Id.
84. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
85. REPORT OF THE FLA. BAR APPELLATE COURT RULES COMM. 6 (1992).
86. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 556.
[Vol. 18
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which the supplemental authorities are pertinent, but stating that the notice
shall not contain argument.8 7
N. Rule 9.220. Appendix
This rule was amended to provide that if an appendix includes
documents filed before January 1991, on paper measuring 8 1/2 by 14
inches, the documents should be reduced in copying to 8 1/2 by 11 inches,
if practicable.88 If impracticable, the appendix may measure 8 1/2 by 14
inches, but it should be bound separately from the document it accompa-
nies. 9
These additions to the rule were necessitated by the adoption of Florida
Rule of Judicial Administration 2,055, which requires the use of 8 1/2 by
11 inch paper for all documents filed in any court and which became
mandatory on January 1, 1991.90 Problems arose when documents filed
prior to that date on the longer paper needed to be included in an appendix
filed after that date and the new rules address those problems.9'
0. Rule 9.300. Motions
Subdivision (b) was clarified to reflect that an order granting an
extension of time for preparation of the record or the index of the record or
for filing of the transcript of proceedings automatically extends, for a like
period, the time for service of the appellant's initial brief.92 Although the
subdivision already provided, and continues to provide, that an order
extending time for any act automatically extends the time for all other acts
that bear a relation to it, the briefing schedule is related by time only to the
filing of the notice of appeal. 93 Thus, it was felt that the existing rule did
not act to automatically extend the time for filing the appellant's brief when
there was a delay in preparing or filing the record, index of record or
transcript. Accordingly, the specific language was added.94 The subdivi-
sion was also modified to eliminate the reference to an order extending time
87. Id. at 556-57.
88. Id. at 558-59.
89. Id. at 559.
90. In re Amendment to the Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., Rule 2.055 (Paper Size), 550
So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1989).
91. FLA. R. App. P. 9.220 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
92. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 559.
93. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(0.
94. FLA. R. App. P. 9.300 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
1993]
13
Musto: Appellate Practice
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
entered by the lower tribunal.9" This action was taken to correlate the rule
with Rule 9.600(a), which provides that only an appellate court can grant an
extension of time for any act under the appellate rules.96
P. Rule 9.310. Stay Pending Review
Subdivision (c)(1) was modified to eliminate the ability of parties
posting a bond through the use of two personal sureties, but to allow parties,
as an alternative, the use of a surety company, to deposit cash in the circuit
court clerk's office. 97 The Committee was of the opinion that a meaning-
ful supersedeas could be obtained only through the use of one of those two
methods. 9' Specific language was also added to note that the lower
tribunal retains continuing jurisdiction to determine the actual sufficiency of
any such bond. 99
Q. Rule 9.800. Uniform Citation System
The uniform citation system set forth in this rule underwent significant
revision.'00 In citing to the Southern Reporter, Second Series, a space
between "So." and "2d" is required.' Similarly, spaces are inserted
between "S." and "Ct." in citing to the Supreme Court Reporter' and
between "L." and "Ed." and "2d" in citing to Lawyer's Edition, Second
Series.0 3 There is no space, however, between "U." and "S." in citing to
United States Reports. 10
4
When citing to a United States Supreme Court decision, the first
citation should include all three of the above reports, while subsequent
citations, as well as pinpoint citations, should be to the United States
Reports only.'05
95. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 558.
96. FLA. R. App. P. 9.300 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
97. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 561.
98. FLA. R. App. P. 9.310 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
99. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 563.
100. The changes are too numerous for each one to be discussed in this article. Some
of the more significant changes will be noted.
101. FLA. R. App. P. 9.800(a)(2), (3).
102. Id. 9.800(k).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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The citation for Florida Law Weekly has been changed to "Fla. L.
Weekly" from "F.L.W."' 6 Other provisions state that the rule applies to
all legal documents, including court opinions,' that citations not covered
by the rule or by The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, shall be in
the form prescribed by the Florida Style Manual published by Florida State
University, 1 8 and that case names should be underscored or italicized in
both text arid footnotes. 10 9
R. Rule 9.900. Forms
Forms 9.900(a), (c) and (e) were revised to remind the practitioner that
conformed copies of the order or orders designated in a notice of appeal or
a notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of district courts of appeal
to review county court orders should be attached to the notice of appeal as
provided in Rules 9.110(d), 9.130(c) and 9.160(c)."0
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Some of the changes to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration
that were made during the same four-year cycle that brought about the
revisions to the appellate rules will also impact on appellate practice. The
changes to the Rules of Judicial Administration were adopted by the
supreme court on October 8, 1992,' and took effect on January 1,
1993. 112
A. Rule 2.040. District Courts of Appeal
Changes in terminology were adopted to reflect changes in the appellate
rules and in the Florida Constitution. In subdivision (b)(5), the term
"petition for rehearing" was changed to "motion pursuant to Florida Rule of
106. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.800(a)(4), (b)(2), (c)(3).
107. Id. 9.800.
108. Id. 9.800(n); see Florida State University Law Review, Florida Style Manual, 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 525 (1991).
109. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.800(o).
I10. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.900 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
11I. The Fla. Bar re: Amendment to Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., 609 So. 2d 465 (Fla.
1992) [hereinafter Judicial Administration].
112. Id. at 466.
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Appellate Procedure 9.330." ''t 3 This action was taken in recognition of the
fact that the appellate rule cited now calls for rehearing by motion, rather
than by petition, and the fact that the rule allows a party to seek not just
rehearing, but also clarification and certification."' In the same subdivi-
sion, the references to a "petition for certiorari" being "filed" in the supreme
court were changed to "discretionary review proceedings" being "timely
commenced" in the supreme court." 5  This substitution was made in
recognition of the changes in article V, section 3(b) of the Florida Constitu-
tion that gave the supreme court the authority to consider cases on
discretionary review rather than by certiorari." 6 The amendments are not
intended to impact on the rule in a substantive manner." 7
B. Rule 2.055. Paper
The most obvious impact of the changes to the Rules of Judicial
Administration will come from the amendments to Rule 2.055, which
require the use of recycled paper for all documents filed in any court." '
The rule defines "recycled paper" as paper containing a minimum content
of fifty percent waste paper. "' The definition was taken from the United
States Environmental Protection Agency Recommended Minimum Content
Standards of Selected Papers and Paper Products. 2 1 In an effort to ensure
the easy availability of paper that meets the definition, no requirement was
included that any of the paper's content be post-consumer waste materi-
als.'12  This amendment provides the one exception to the effective date
of the four-year cycle revisions. Although it took effect on January 1, 1993,
like the other rule changes, it does not become mandatory until January 1,
1994. 122
113. Id. at 472.
114. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. COMM. 2 (1992).
115. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 472.
116. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. COMM. 2 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 476.
119. Id.
120. See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,546 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250) (proposed
June 22, 1988).
121. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. COMM. 9 (1992).
122. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 476.
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C. Rule 2.060. Attorneys
Changes to subdivision (b) of this rule require foreign attorneys who
seek to appear in particular cases in Florida courts to be active members of
the bar of another state. 3 These foreign attorneys are also required to
submit verified motions for permission to appear with or before their initial
personal appearance, paper, motion or pleading." 4 Moreover, they must
also state in the motion all jurisdictions in which they are active members
in good standing of the Bar and the number of cases in which they have
filed a motion for permission to appear in Florida in the preceding three
years. 25
D. Rule 2.160. Disqualification of Trial Judges
This is a new rule that deals with the disqualification of trial judges.
It embodies the dictates of Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd.,'26 which
interpreted sections 38.02 and 38.10 of the Florida Statutes, dealing with
disqualification. The rule states in subdivision (a) that it applies only to
circuit and county court judges.2 7  That is because it was held in In re
Carlton121 that sections 38.02 and 38.10 do not apply to appellate judg-
es.29 In adopting this rule, the supreme court stated that it declined "to
adopt a review authority"1 3' as part of the rule, indicating that authority
for review must be in the appellate rules.' 3' Accordingly, the court asked
that the Appellate Court Rules Committee consider the appropriate authority
for reviewing orders of disqualification and whether an amendment to the
123. Id. at 477.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 561 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1990).
127. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 490.
128. 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980).
129. Because subdivision (a) indicates that the rule applies "to county and circuit judges
in all matters in all divisions of court", the question may well arise as to whether the rule
applies to circuit judges sitting in their appellate capacity. It appears that the rule was not
intended to apply in such a manner. The committee report proposing the change indicates
that "[s]ubdivision (a) of the proposed rule limits the scope of the rule to trial judges," and
states that the limitation is in recognition of the fact that in Carlton, the supreme court found
that the statutory provisions that were later interpreted in Brown, the case that formed the
basis for the rule, do not apply to appellate judges. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL
ADMIN. COMM. :28 (1992). Moreover, the title of the rule specifically refers to trial judges.
130. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 466.
131. Id.
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appellate rules is necessary.32 Thus, it is presently unclear what form of
review is appropriate for orders dealing with disqualification. Presumably,
this question will be answered by revision of the appellate rules or by case
law in the near future.
III. CASES
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those substan-
tive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this article will
focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and will deal
with substantive areas only with regard to appellate considerations unique
to those areas. The article will be limited to appellate practice in the
supreme court and the district courts of appeal and will not deal with issues
relating to circuit courts sitting in their appellate capacities, except insofar
as such issues relate or compare to the district courts or the supreme court.
Additionally, this article will not discuss cases relating to the preservation
of issues or the question of whether particular errors were harmless.
A. The Appellate Process
1. Notice of Appeal
In Alfonso v. Department of Environmental Regulation,'33 the su-
preme court dealt with a situation in which an appellant filed a notice of
appeal in the district court of appeal, rather than in the circuit court, as
required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.1 10(b). Receding from
its prior decision in Lampkin-Asam v. District Court of Appeal,'34 the
court in Alfonso held "that an appellate court's jurisdiction is invoked by a
timely filing of a notice of appeal or a petition for certiorari in either the
lower court that issued the order to be reviewed or the appellate court which
would have jurisdiction to review the order."' 35 It is thus likely that the
appellate rules will need to be amended to incorporate this holding.
132. Id.
133. 616 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1993).
134. 364 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1978).
135. Alfonso, 616 So. 2d at 47.
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In In re E.H.,36 the court found that in a case involving the termina-
tion of parental rights, parents are entitled to belated appeals based on
ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys fail to timely file the
notices of appeal. 37  The court stated, "[w]e do not believe that the
attorney's mistake should be imputed to the mother when the consequence
of the mistake is the mother's permanent loss of custody of her chil-
dren."' 38  While such reasoning is routinely employed to grant belated
appeals in criminal cases, its application in the civil context is quite unusual.
As the court noted, "[w]e did not grant the belated appeal in this case based
on precedent, but on the significant policy interest in ensuring that a parent
and child are not separated without a thorough review of the merits of the
case."' 39 The court also found a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
trial court to be the appropriate remedy for obtaining a belated appeal in this
context. 
40
2. Captions of Cases and Parties
In Fink v. Holt,141 the Fourth District Court of Appeal disapproved
of the widespread practice of identifying appeals in forfeiture cases by
reference to the property involved. The notice of appeal and the briefs in
the case bore a caption identical to that used in the circuit court proceeding,
which read, "In Re: Forfeiture of One 1985 Chevrolet Corvette, Florida Tag
No. ACL959, VIN 161YY0785F5100137, Together With All Tangible and
Intangible Personal Property Found Therein."', 42 Noting that the rules of
appellate procedure 43 require that the caption of cases contain the name
and designation of at least one party on each side, the court, on its own
motion, amended the caption of the appeal to identify the parties in-
volved. 14
4
The Fourth District also questioned the wisdom in the naming of the
trial court judge as the only proper respondent in a petition for a writ of
136. 609 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1992).
137. Id. at 1290.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1291.
140. Id.
141. 609 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
142. Id. at 1335.
143. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(d), 9.900(a).
144. Fink, 609 So. 2d at 1336.
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prohibition. In Fabber v. Wessel,'45 the court stated that the response filed
in the case on behalf of the named respondent judge,'46 which took
exception with the accuracy of the petitioner's factual account, created "an
intolerable adversary atmosphere between the trial judge and the liti-
gant."' 47 Although the court declined to hold that any response filed by
a judge in a prohibition-disqualification proceeding is per se disqualifying,
the court stated that it is "decidedly dangerous" for the judge to respond and
suggested that it is "much the better practice" for the judge to remain silent
and let the adversarial party supply the response. 4 '
3. Record on Appeal
a. Contents of Record
Several cases addressed issues relating to the record on appeal. In
Citizens of the State of Florida v. Beard,49 the supreme court was called
upon to decide whether memoranda of staff and transcripts of agenda
conferences are properly included in records of appeals from decisions of
the Public Service Commission. The court concluded that such memoranda
are properly considered part of the record if they are memoranda of staff
who testify or otherwise become involved in the hearing with which the
appeal is concerned. 5 ' On the other hand, when the advisory staff neither
testifies nor actively participates in the hearing, such memoranda are not to
be considered part of the record.'' The court recognized that an agenda
conference is somewhat akin to the discussion of appellate judges in
conference, but concluded that the transcripts of such conferences may be
made part of an appellate record because the conferences are public
meetings and the transcripts are public records.'52
An effort to supplement the record with an affidavit of the trial judge,
setting forth the judge's recollection of a hearing, was rejected by the First
145. 604 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 617 So. 2d 322 (Fla.
1993).
146. The court indicated that the fact that the response was prepared and signed by a
member of the attorney general's staff did not make it any less a response by the judge, for
it was submitted expressly in his name. Id. at 534 n. I.
147. Id. at 534 (quoting Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978)).
148. Id.
149. 613 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1992).
150. Id. at 404.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 405.
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District in Hadden v. State. " The court noted that such an affidavit is
not part of the record as defined by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.200 and that the affidavit in the case was not the product of the procedure
set forth by Rule 9.200(b)(4) for offering a statement of the evidence for use
when a transcript is unavailable.' 54
b. Filing of Record and Transcripts
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(e) states that "Itlhe burden
to ensure that the record is prepared and transmitted in accordance with
these rules shall be on the petitioner or appellant."' 55 In Kobel v. Schlos-
ser, 156 the Fourth District indicated that it was placing "everyone" on
notice that it was interpreting this provision "to require an appellant to seek
an enlargement of time to prepare the record and serve the index, or other
appropriate relief where such is necessary, before the expiration of the
period prescribed by the rules."' 57 The court allotted the responsibility in
this manner, rather than requiring the circuit court appeals clerk to seek
enlargements of time when necessary, a process that had apparently been
followed at some point in the past.
In Freeman v. State, 58 the Fourth District also indicated that it was
"not sympathetic to requests for extraordinary extensions of time because the
court reporter has too many cases,"' 59 particularly in criminal cases. The
court went on to state, "[t]his court will not tolerate court reporters delaying
criminal appeals, while defendants are incarcerated, because the reporters
knowingly take on more work than they can timely perform.""" In light
of these principles, the court imposed a fine on a court reporter who
received a sixty day extension to prepare a transcript of a five day trial, who
unsuccessfully sought a second, fifty day extension and who filed the
transcript over a month after the date set by the court in denying her second
motion. "'
153. 616 So. 2d 153 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
154. Id. at 154.
155. FLA. R. App. P. 9.200(e).
156. 601 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
157. Id. at 602-03.
158. 621 So, 2d 472 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
159. Id. at 473.
160. Id. 1
161. Id.
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4. Motions
In City of Miami Beach v. Korostishevski,62 the First District com-
mented that it is an improper procedure for a party wanting some relief from
the court to send a letter to the court or to make a phone call to the
clerk.'63 Rather, the court indicated that such parties should file an
appropriate motion.'64
The Fourth District, in Kobel, noted that motions for additional time to
do something required or permitted by the rules, filed after the expiration
of the original period, are required to show some good reason why timely
application was not sought.
165
In Lurie v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 166 the First District pointed
out that the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not authorize a reply
to a response to a motion and that such unauthorized pleadings are
ordinarily ignored or sua sponte stricken by the court.
1 67
In In re C.G.,68 the Second District published an order granting a
short extension of time "as notice that parental termination appeals should
be expedited by all persons involved in the process."'' 69 The court noted
that in the future it will grant extensions in such cases only for extraordinary
reasons and will impose sanctions, if necessary, to assure that the cases are
expedited.'70
5. Briefs
In F.M W. Properties, Inc. v. Peoples First Financial Savings & Loan
Ass'n,'' the First District pointed out that "proper organization of briefs
pursuant to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure is not only desirable
and convenient, it has become an absolute necessity."'7I The court
refrained from striking the appellant's brief in the case despite the fact that
the argument section of the brief did not track the issues the appellants
162. 619 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
163. Id. at 495.
164. Id.
165. Kobel, 601 So. 2d at 603.
166. 605 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
167. Id. at 1025.
168. 609 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
169. Id. at 632.
170. Id.
171. 606 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
172. Id. at 377.
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purported to raise.'73  The court noted, however, "that the failure to
organize arguments under cogent and distinct issues on appeal presents
sufficient reason for an appellate court to decline consideration of a
matter."' 
74
The First District also provided guidance as to the appropriate
procedure to correct typographical errors in briefs. In North Florida
Regional Medical Center v. Witt,'17 the court disapproved of the practice
of providing the court with pages upon which corrections have been made
to be substituted for the original pages. The court stated, "[w]e do not have
the staff resources to perform such tasks nor are we willing to accept the
responsibility for error that might occur in the process."' 76  Rather, the
court indicated that parties moving to amend briefs must accompany their
motions with an original and three copies of an amended brief.' 77 The
same process is to be followed, the court noted, by any party required to
serve an amended brief due to the striking of a brief.7 8
In Beatty v. State,'79 the Second District denied a motion to file an
enlarged brief of sixty-five pages 80 when forty pages were used for the
statement of facts.' The court noted that the statement started at the
beginning of the trial and summarized the testimony of every witness who
testified, without regard to the issues on appeal.'82 The court stated that
this approach made it "virtually impossible to obtain an overview of the
factual situation," which the court indicated should be the purpose of the
statement of facts.'83 Moreover, the court noted that it could "only
assume this method is used because it is easier than setting forth the facts
in a logical, more readable fashion."' 84 Although recognizing that it had
little control in most cases as to the method used by appellate counsel to
173. Id.
174. Id. at 377-78.
175. 616 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
176. Id. at 614-15.
177. Id. at 615.
178. Id.
179. 621 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
180. Absent court permission, initial briefs of appellants and answer briefs of appellees
are limited to 50 pages by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(5).
181. Beatty, 621 So. 2d at 678.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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state the facts, the court commented that it had "no intention of encouraging
the practice used here." '185
6. Appendices
The First District, in Korostishevski, dealt with the question of how
appellees in appeals from non-final orders in workers' compensation cases
should cite to items not included in appellants' appendices which appellees
feel are necessary to the court's decision.' 86 The court interpreted Florida
Rule of Workers' Compensation 4.180(b)(3) as calling for such appellees to
file their own appendix and for citations in their briefs to be made to
appellant's appendix, appellee's appendix, or both, as may be appropri-
ate. 187
In a case involving review of non-final administrative orders, Agency
for Health Care Administration v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System,
Inc., '8 the First District rejected an attempt to file as an appendix evi-
dence which had not been submitted to the hearing officer for consideration.
It was unsuccessfully argued that the 1977 Committee Note to Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.100(e) authorized the inclusion of such materi-
al. 89 That note refers to an appendix "containing conformed copies of the
order to be reviewed and other relevant material, including portions of the
record, if a record exists."' 9° The court noted the basic rule that an appeal
asserting error on the part of a lower tribunal' 9' can only be based on
evidence presented to that tribunal and stated that any exception to the
general rule which may be implied from the committee note was not present
in the case.' 92
7. Relinquishment of Jurisdiction
In Lurie v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.,' 93 the First District discussed
the procedures and standards involved when a party seeks relinquishment of
jurisdiction. The court stated that the burden is on the moving party to
185. Id.
186. Korostishevski, 619 So. 2d at 494.
187. Id. at 495.
188. 617 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
189. Id.
190. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(e) Committee Note-1977 Amendment.
191. Agencyfor Health Care Admin., 617 So. 2d at 389.
192. Id.
193. 605 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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show entitlement to relief' 94 and that the presumption is that judicial
economy would be best served by leaving jurisdiction in the appellate court
until issuance of mandate'95 and that, a party wishing to overcome that
presumption must show entitlement to relief by informing the court of the
specific nature of the proceedings it seeks to have conducted in the trial
court. 196
8. Notices of Supplemental Authority
In Ogden Allied Services v. Panesso,'97 the First District struck
notices of supplemental authority and published its order doing so "to place
the bar on notice" that abuses involved with such notices will be treated
similarly. The appellee in the case, on the afternoon before oral argument,
filed and served a notice of supplemental authority which had attached to
it copies of twenty-two cases, totalling 125 pages, all of which had been
decided before the appellee's answer brief was filed. 9 The notice
prompted the appellants to respond with their own notices on the morning
of oral argument.'99
The court found such filings to be a misuse of Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.2 10(g) and Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation
Procedure 4.225, which "are intended to permit a litigant to bring to the
court's attention cases of real significance to the issues raised which were
not cited in the briefs, either because they were not decided until after the
briefs had been filed; or because, through inadvertence, they were not
discovered earlier. 22 These rules, the court went on to state, "are not
intended to permit a litigant to submit what amounts to an additional brief,
under the guise of 'supplemental authorities'; or to ambush an opponent by
deliberately withholding significant case citations until just before oral
argument. 20'
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1025.
196. Id.
197, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
198. Id. at 1023.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1024.
201. Id.
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9. Proceedings After Appellate Determination is Final
In Green v. Rety, 2 the supreme court considered the certified question
of whether Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340(c), which states that
if a judgment of reversal is entered that requires the entry of a money
judgment on a verdict, the mandate shall be deemed to require such money
judgment to be entered as of the date of the verdict, applies when an
appellate court-ordered remittitur requires entry of ajudgment in an amount
less than the full amount of the jury's verdict.2 °3 The court concluded that
the district court's finding that the trial court's remittitur had been excessive
constituted a "reversal" under the rule. 204 Accordingly, the court answered
the question in the affirmative, found that the date of the verdict controlled,
and determined that all interest would be computed from that date.20 5
In City of Miami v. Arostegui, °6 the First District issued its mandate
after the appellant filed a notice invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of
the supreme court. The appellant moved to recall the mandate. The motion
was treated as a motion to stay the effect of the mandate and was denied by
the court.
The court found that the filing of a notice invoking discretionary
jurisdiction does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction to issue a
mandate.20 7 The court rejected a claim that the automatic stay provision
of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2), which states that the
timely filing of a notice of appeal by a public body or a public officer shall
automatically operate as a stay, applies when discretionary review is
sought °.2 8 The court also rejected an additional argument that the mere
fact that a case was pending review in the supreme court compels a district
court to recall its mandate. 20 9 The court therefore concluded that when a
public body desires to stay the decision of a district court while discre-
tionary review is pending, it should file a motion to stay the mandate before
the mandate is issued by the district court.210 Once the mandate is issued,
202. 616 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1993).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 435.
205. Id.
206. 616 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
207. Id. at 1119.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1121.
210. Id.
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the court stated, a motion to stay its effect should be filed in the supreme
court.21
In Wilcox v. Hotelerama Associates, Ltd,2 12 the Third District dealt
with the question of whether, after mandate issued in a case that was
reversed and remanded for a new trial, the trial court could stay the retrial
until the losing parties on appeal paid an award of appellate costs or posted
a cost bond. The court found such a stay to be improper, noting that "a trial
court's role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court becomes
purely ministerial, and its function is limited to obeying the appellate court's
order or decree." '2 3 Despite recognizing the broad discretion a trial court
has in ordering stays in proceedings before it,214 the court concluded that
in light of its specific mandate, which was not conditioned upon payment
of the appellate costs, "the trial court was without discretion in its obligation
to proceed with the disposition of the case without entering a stay pending
the payment of the costs of the appeal." '215
In In re B.C.,216 the First District held that the county, rather than the
state, has the burden of paying for appointed counsel and for costs in
proceedings for the termination of parental rights.2" 7 The court relied on
section 43.28 of the Florida Statutes, which requires counties to provide,
among other things, the "personnel necessary to operate the circuit and
county courts."2 ' The court rejected the county's contention that a
different result was compelled by article VII, section 18 of the Florida
Constitution, which limits the circumstances under which a county can be
required by a general law to spend funds. The court concluded that the
constitutional provision, which was ratified by the electorate in the
November, 1990 election, was prospective in operation and thus targeted at
211. Arostegui, 616 So. 2d at 1121.
212. 619 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
213. Id. at 445-46 (citing Milton v. Keith, 503 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987); O.P. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1974); Berger v.
Leposky, 103 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1958)).
214. Id. at 446 (citing Regan, Inc. v. Val-Ro, Ltd., 396 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Neale v. Aycock, 340 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied,
351 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1977); Price v. Hernando Beach, Inc., 286 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973)).
215. Id.
216. 610 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), reviewgranted., 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1992).
217. Id
218. Id. at n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 43.28 (Supp. 1992)).
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laws passed after its effective date,219 laws which do not include section
43.28 of the Florida Statutes.
Several other cases also dealt with issues relating to appellate attorney's
fees. In Hernstadt v. Brickell Bay Club Condominium Ass 'n,22° the Third
District found that when an appellate court awards appellate attorney's fees
and remands for a determination of the amount, it is improper for the party
against whom the fees are to be assessed to argue in the trial court or on a
subsequent appeal the issue of entitlement to the fees.221 In Duffy v.
Brooker,222 the First District rejected a claim that sections 59.46 and
766.206(3) of the Florida Statutes mandate an award of appellate attorney's
fees to prevailing parties in medical malpractice cases on the issue of
compliance with the reasonable investigation requirements of chapter 766,
Florida Statutes.223  In Langel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,224 the
Fourth District found attorney's fees appropriate when the appellants
impermissibly sought to reargue issues they had already raised and argued,
and which were rejected, in a previous appeal.225
B. Appeals in Workers' Compensation Cases
In Hines Electric v. McClure,226 the First District interpreted Florida
Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.160(b), a recently adopted
rule 227 that deals with appellate review of non-final orders. The rule states
that the district court "may" review certain listed non-final orders.
The court stated that it was "candidly perplexed' 228 by the new rule.
The court pointed out that the rule was derived from Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.130, but that the appellate rule provides for review
as a matter of right from the non-final orders listed therein. 229 The court
further noted that neither the text of the rule nor the commentary accompa-
219. Id. at 628.
220. 602 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
221. Id. at 968.
222. 614 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
223. Id. at 547.
224. 614 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
225. Id. at 1218.
226. 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
227. Amendments to Fla. Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure, 603 So. 2d 425
(Fla. 1992).
228. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 134.
229. Id.
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nying its adoption provided guidance as to the correct legal standard to be
utilized in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction.23
The court also pointed out that the rule provides for discretionary
review of some orders that were reviewable by common law certiorari, and
some that were not reviewable by certiorari or otherwise until a final order
was entered by a judge of compensation claims.23' This fact caused the
court to comment that there was no indication of whether the adoption of
the rule was intended to provide for review of a greater number of orders
prior to the ultimate disposition by the judge of compensation claims, or to
ease the appellate court's overburdened docket by granting greater flexibility
to refuse certain types of cases.232
The court went on to indicate that the rule did not set forth a procedur-
al mechanism for the parties to address the jurisdictional issue233 nor did
the rule set forth a standard of review to be used after jurisdiction is
accepted.234 Summing up its frustration with the rule, the court opined
that it "creates a whole new type of review which did not previously exist
under Florida law" '235 and that the court was "faced with the unenviable
task of determining the procedural and substantive effect of a rule that is
unclear, ambiguous and which could have a significant impact ' on the
court's workload.237
The court therefore adopted a procedure calling for a party seeking
review pursuant to Rule 4.160(b) to file a brief and an appendix along with
the notice of appeal. 23' The brief is to address whether the court should
exercise its jurisdiction and the merits of the issue being appealed.239
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 134.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 134-35.
237. The court noted that it appeared that the rule was adopted without any meaningful
input from the judges of the court, which has statewide primary jurisdiction over workers'
compensation appeals. The court took issue with the opinion adopting the rules by the
supreme court, which stated that the proposed new rules had been published in the Florida
Bar News. Amendments to Fla. Rules of Workers'Compensation Procedure, 603 So. 2d at
425. The court stated that all that was actually published was a summary of the rules and
that the summary, in the court's opinion, was not accurate. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 135
n.5.
238. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 136.
239. Id.
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The court will then review the brief and appendix to determine whether
the appellant has demonstrated a prima facie case for entitlement to
interlocutory relief.24° For appeals from all orders listed in the rule other
than discovery matters under subdivision (b)(5), the court will exercise its
discretion to review the order if the order is one that would be reviewable
as a matter of right under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.241
If the order is not one reviewable as a matter of right under the appellate
rule, the court will exercise its discretion only if: (1) the order constitutes
a departure from the essential requirements of law; (2) would cause material
harm; and (3) could not be adequately remedied by appeal.242 Appeals
relating to discovery matters under subdivision (b)(5) will be judged by the
standard set forth by that provision, which requires the party seeking review
to demonstrate irreparable harm and that there is no adequate remedy at law
to rectify such harm.243
If the court determines that a prima facie basis for relief exists, it will
issue an order accepting jurisdiction and briefing will continue in accordance
with the appellate rules.244 The answer and reply briefs will also need to
address the jurisdictional issue. 45
The court recognized that as it gained more experience with this type
of case, it may have to revisit the adopted procedure.246 The court also
urged the Workers' Compensation Rules Committee to revisit the rules in
an effort to alleviate the problems discussed in the opinion.247
C. Appeals in Criminal Cases
1. Appointed Counsel
In Green v. State,248 the supreme court dealt with a situation in which
a court-appointed attorney for a defendant, whose conviction and death
sentence had been upheld, requested the trial court to appoint him at the
county's expense for the purpose of petitioning the United States Supreme
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 136.
244. Id. at 136-37.
245. Id. at 137.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 620 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1993).
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Court for certiorari.249 The supreme court reversed the denial of this
motion, finding that the ruling denied the defendant equal protection under
article 1, section 2 of the Florida Constitution.25°
The defendant had initially been represented on appeal by the public
defender, who withdrew due to an excessive caseload. 25' A private
attorney was then appointed to handle the unsuccessful appeal.252 At a
hearing on the motion to appoint counsel for the United States Supreme
Court proceeding, testimony was presented that the public defender seeks
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court in every case in which
the defendant is sentenced to death.253
The supreme court concluded that when a defendant is represented by
court-appointed counsel and is sentenced to death, "the court-appointed
counsel must have the same professional independence to seek federal relief
on an individual basis as the public defender whom court-appointed counsel
replaces and must be compensated accordingly. 254
In Turner v. State, 25 5 the Fourth District also addressed an issue
dealing with appointed counsel. In that case, the attorney that had been
appointed to represent the defendant at trial, due to the public defender's
conflict of interest, was later appointed for the purpose of appeal.2"6 On
motion for reconsideration by the County Commission of Palm Beach
County, which was concerned with the expense of appointed counsel, the
trial court determined that the conflict of interest did not carry through to
the appellate stage and that it was obligated to appoint the public defend-
er.21 Noting first that Palm Beach County had no standing to intervene
in the proceedings, 258 the appellate court found that because the public
defender asserted that the conflict still existed, the issue of conflict was not
extinguished, as an appeal is merely a continuation of the original proceed-
249. Id. at 188.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 188-89.
252. Id. at 189.
253. Green. 620 So. 2d at 189.
254. Id. at 190.
255. 611 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
256. Id. at 12.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial
Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1990); Escambia County v. Behr, 384 So. 2d
147 (Fla. 1980)).
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ings. 9  The court therefore reversed the order appointing the public
defender and directed the trial court to appoint a special counsel to represent
the defendant on appeal.
2 60
2. Appellate Proceedings Instituted by the State
In State v. Zenobia,26 1 the Fourth District discussed the manner in
which it reviews petitions for writs of common law certiorari in which the
state seeks review of a pre-trial ruling on a motion in limine denying the
state's request to admit certain evidence. The court noted that it viewed
such rulings as "entirely tentative, 2 62 because a judge "may suffer a
change of mind,263 after the evidence is actually adduced at the trial.
Accordingly, the court stated that it begins its "analysis of a petition for
certiorari seeking reversal of a pre-trial exclusion of evidence with an
inclination to forego extraordinary review., 264  The court went on to
indicate that when the pre-trial exclusion is attended also by factual rulings
by the trial judge, such as a finding that the evidence's unfair prejudicial
aspects outweigh its probative value, the court is "doubly reluctant" to
reverse the exclusion.265
An unusual situation presented itself in State v. Lozano,266 when the
state petitioned the First District for a writ of certiorari purportedly to
protect a defendant's constitutional rights. The case dealt with a situation
in which the trial court granted a defense motion for a change of venue and
moved the trial from Miami to Orlando.267 Subsequently, the court on its
own motion, moved the trial to Tallahassee. 268 The defendant then moved
for another change of venue. 69
After the trial court took evidence and heard argument on the motion
for change of venue, the state joined in the motion insofar as the defendant
claimed that his rights were violated by the small Hispanic population in
259. Id. at 13 (citing Aranda v. State, 205 So. 2d 667, 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. dismissed, 218 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1968).
260. Turner, 611 So. 2d at 13.
261. 614 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
262. Id. at 1139.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1140.
265. Id.
266. 616 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
267. Id. at 74.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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Tallahassee's county and because the site was chosen solely upon racially-
based reasons.
2 70
The appellate court initially noted its concern with the question of
whether its jurisdiction was timely invoked because the state was in effect
challenging the order moving the case to Tallahassee, which had been
entered some ten months before the petition was filed.2 7' The court
pointed out that the State's challenge to the order was not presented to the
trial court until the day the petition was filed.272 It then stated that
although it could be argued that the State's challenge was untimely, the
court would decline "to adopt a rule which would preclude the State from
asserting at any time that continued prosecution under the circumstances
would constitute a violation of the constitutional rights of a criminal defen-
dant. 2 73 The court therefore concluded that the state's petition was timely
and proceeded to consider the case on the merits.274
In State v. Ashley,275 the Second District denied the state's petition
for certiorari without opinion. A specially concurring opinion by Judge
Parker, however, reveals the existence of an interesting issue. The judge
noted that he concurred because of the supreme court's decision in State v.
MacLeod,276 which concluded that the state has no statutory right to appeal
a trial counr's order which denies restitution in a criminal case "provided the
reasons for the denial are set forth. 277 The concurring opinion stated that
because no right of appeal exists, no right of review by certiorari exists.2 7
Judge Parker therefore opined that, a victim of a crime is denied the
right of appellate review of a trial court's denial of restitution from a
criminal defendant if the trial judge lists any reasons, right or wrong, for the
denial.2 79 Thus, notwithstanding his belief that the right of restitution in
this case was denied for reasons contrary to Florida law, Judge Parker felt
270. Id.
271. Lozano, 616 So. 2d at 75.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. In doing so, the court noted that the state, in an appeal from a Tallahassee
conviction, would be bound by its position that the motion for change of venue should have
been granted. Id. at n.4.
275. 621 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
276. 600 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1992).
277. Id. at 1098.
278. Ashley, 621 So. 2d at 743 (Parker, J., specially concurring) (citing Jones v. State,
477 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1985)).
279. Id
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compelled to concur with the appellate court's decision.28 ° Judge Parker
went on to note that as long as MacLeod remains the law, establishing a
right to appellate review for victims who are wrongly denied restitution will
apparently require legislative action.28'
3. Cross Appeals by Defendants
In State v. Waterman,282 the state appealed a trial court's pre-trial
order partially suppressing seized evidence.283  The defendant cross
appealed that aspect of the order denying his motion to suppress all of the
evidence.284  The state moved to dismiss the cross appeal on the ground
that it was not authorized under the appellate rules.285 Aligning itself with
the decision of the Fifth District in State v. McAdams,286 the Second
District found that a cross appeal was not foreclosed.287
In doing so, the court noted that several districts have held that there
is no jurisdiction to entertain a cross appeal when the order in question is
one which could not have been independently appealed by the defendant,
such as a ruling or motion to suppress.288 It thus appears that the issue
involved in this case is one that will have to eventually be resolved by the
supreme court.289
4. Application of Florida Supreme Court
Precedent to Pending Cases
In Smith v. State,29° the supreme court, relying on article I, sections
9 and 16 of the Florida Constitution, established a clear standard regarding
280. Id. at 744.
281. Id.
282. 613 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
283. Id. at 565-66.
284. Id. at 566.
285. Id.
286. 559 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
287. Waterman, 613 So. 2d at 566.
288. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 444 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State
v. Willits, 413 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Clark, 384 So. 2d 687 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1980)).
289. In State v. Lopez, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1914 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. .App. Aug. 31,
1993), the Third District adhered to its view that a cross appeal is inappropriate and, pursuant
to article V, section (3)(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, certified to the supreme court that
the decision was in conflict with Waterman and McAdams.
290. 598 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1992).
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the retrospective application of its decisions in criminal cases. Noting that
it was troubled by the inconsistency or lack of clarity in its various decisions
on the subject, 9' the court held "that any decision of this Court announc-
ing a new rule of law, or merely applying an established rule of law to a
new or different situation, must be given retrospective application by the
courts of this state in every case pending on direct review or not yet
final." '292 The court went on to note that in order to benefit from the
change in law, defendants must have timely objected at trial if an objection
was required to preserve the issue for appellate review."'
5. Appellate Jurisdiction After Change of Venue
In Vasilinda v. Lozano,294 a member of the media challenged an order
restricting certain aspects of television coverage of a criminal trial.295 The
challenge was brought in the Third District, the court that hears appeals
from cases in the Eleventh Circuit, where the charges had originally been
filed. Because a change of venue had been granted,2 96 moving the case
to the Ninth Circuit, and because the trial judge had been assigned by the
supreme court to serve as judge of that circuit for purposes of the case, the
district court transferred the appellate proceeding to the Fifth District, which
has appellate jurisdiction over Ninth Circuit cases.297
In an opinion filed the following day, the Fifth District indicated that
it was unclear as to whether the factors relied upon by the Third District
gave the court jurisdiction over the appeal. 29' Because the trial was set to
start one business day later, the court did address the issues presented by the
case; 299 it also certified to the supreme court as a matter of great public
importance, the question of when jurisdiction vests and in which appellate
court jurisdiction lies when a change of venue is granted to a circuit in
291. Id. at 1064.
292. Id. at 1066.
293. Id.
294. 622 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
295. Id. at 5.
296. The defendant was the same defendant involved in the case of State v. Lozano, 616
So. 2d 73 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993). See also supra text accompanying notes 264-72.
297. Vasilinda, 622 So. 2d at 5.
298. Vasilinda v. Lozano, 618 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.); reviewgranted,
__ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
299. Id. at 759-60.
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another district and the circuit judge is appointed as a judge of the circuit
to which the case is transferred.3"'
A similar issue was dealt with by the Fourth District in Kohut v.
Evans. T'M In that case, a change of venue had been granted, moving the
matter from the Thirteenth Circuit, within the Second District, to the
Fifteenth Circuit, within the Fourth District and in which an order had been
entered temporarily assigning the trial judge of the Thirteenth Circuit to the
Fifteenth Circuit to hear the case.30 2 On his own motion, the trial judge
re-examined the venue question and determined that a jury would be
selected in the Fifteenth Circuit and that the case would then be returned to
the Thirteenth Circuit for the remainder of the trial, with the jurors
sequestered within that circuit.30 3
One of the defendants challenged the procedure in a petition for writ
of prohibition filed in the Second District. That court determined that the
petition was directed to the trial judge in his capacity as a judge of the
Fifteenth Circuit and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to address the
merits of the petition. Accordingly, it transferred the case to the Fourth
District.304 The Fourth District stated that it was unsure whether the trial
judge thought he was acting as a Fifteenth Circuit judge when he issued the
order in question, but accepted that it was the appropriate court to take
jurisdiction of the case because the judge was to be acting as a judge of the
Fifteenth Circuit in conducting the jury selection and ordering the jury to
return to the Thirteenth Circuit for the remainder of the trial.305
D. Certification of Questions
In Bradley v. State,30 6 the First District discussed the circumstances
under which the court will exercise its discretionary review authority and
consider certified questions from county courts pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4). The opinion dealt with two appeals in
which county courts had certified essentially the same question as one of
great public importance.
300. Id. at 759.
301. 623 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
302. Id. at 569.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 615 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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The court noted there existed little discussion in case law to guide it in
exercising its discretion, but determined that it should accept jurisdiction in
at least one of the appeals because the issue was one of constitutional
magnitude that was frequently raised in the lower tribunals.3"7 Pointing
to its "highly taxing" caseload, the court concluded that there was no useful
purpose to be served by accepting more than one appeal presenting the
issue.3 °8 Doing so, the court stated, would only delay resolution of other
matters before the court.3 °9 The court therefore accepted jurisdiction in
the appeal that involved factors which made the preparation of the record
and briefing easier and declined to accept jurisdiction in the other.31°
The First District also declined to accept an appeal involving a certified
question from a county court in State v. Boyd,31' noting that such appeals
are appropriate from non-final orders under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.030(b)(4)(B) only when the orders are otherwise appealable to
the circuit court." 2 Since the order in the case was not appealable in that
manner, the court concluded that it was without jurisdiction.3"3
The First District also found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
certified questions in Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services v. State."4 In that case, the questions were certified by a circuit
court and the appellate court determined that only county courts have the
authority to certify questions.35
In several cases, such as State v. Burgos,3 16 the Fourth District
employed a method of double certification that resulted in a county court
case being reviewed by the supreme court. Pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.160, the court accepted jurisdiction from an order
certified by a county court to be of great public importance. In turn, the
court certified to the supreme court, pursuant to Rule 9.125, not only that
the issues were of great public importance, but also that they had an effect
307. Id. at 855.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 610 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
312. Id. at 65.
313. Id.
314. 616 So. 2d 66 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
315. Id. at 68.
316. 614 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 618 So. 2d 1369 (Fla
1993).
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on the administration of justice throughout the state and that the case
required immediate resolution by the supreme court.317
E. Effect of Prior Prohibition Proceedings on Appeals
In Thomason v. State,3 t8 the Fourth District considered a direct appeal
from an order withholding adjudication and placing a defendant on
probation in a criminal case. The defendant raised a double jeopardy claim
that he had previously asserted in a petition for writ of prohibition that had
been denied without opinion by the same court.319 The court affirmed
without opinion, but Judge Farmer, in a dissenting opinion, addressed the
question of whether consideration of the double jeopardy claim was proper
in light of the prior proceeding.32 °
Judge Farmer noted that such consideration was appropriate because
prohibition is an "extraordinarily prerogative writ"32' that is sometimes
denied for good reasons having nothing to do with the underlying merits of
a petitioner's position.322 The judge noted that his view323 was contrary
to that taken by the Third District in Obanion v. State,"' in which the
court considered a claim previously raised in a prohibition proceeding, but
stated that in future cases, summary denials of petitions for writs of
prohibition would be deemed to be denials on the merits unless the denial
says otherwise.325 Judge Farmer stated that the Fourth District had never
adopted such a rule and that he hopes it never does, "at least as long as
prohibition is deemed a matter of mere grace.5
326
317. Id. at 694.
318. 594 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed on other grounds, 620 So.
2d 1234 (Fla. 1993).
319. Thomason v. State, 620 So. 2d 1234, 1236.
320. Thomason, 594 So. 2d at 310. (Farmer, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 312 n.2 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
322. Id.
323. The other members of the panel apparently shared Judge Farmer's belief that
review of the merits was appropriate because the case was affirmed, rather than dismissed.
324. 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), reviewdenied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.
1987).
325. Thomason, 594 So. 2d at 312 n.2 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
326. Id.
[Vol. 1 8
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/2
Musto
This conflict between the districts... was not resolved by the supreme
court's review of Thomason, as the court's opinion, despite setting forth the
procedural history of the case,32 dealt only with the merits of the double
jeopardy claim.329
F. Cross Appeals When Appeals are Untimely
In Peltz v. District Court of Appeal, Third District,33 the supreme
court dealt with the question of whether a district court has jurisdiction to
consider a cross appeal when the original notice of appeal is untimely. The
case involved a situation in which one party filed an untimely notice of
appeal from an order of a trial court."' Ten days later, the opposing party
filed a notice of cross appeal.332 Subsequently, a notice of voluntary
dismissal of the original appeal was filed and the district court entered an
order accepting the voluntary dismissal but stating that the cross appeal
would remain pending.33
3
Acting on a petition for prohibition, the supreme court found that the
notice of cross appeal could not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction
and that because the original notice of appeal did not vest the district court
with jurisdiction to proceed, there was no jurisdictional basis upon which the
notice of cross appeal could be based. 34  Accordingly, prohibition was
granted.335
327. The approach taken by the Third District in Obanion also conflicts with that taken
by the First District in State v. Falls Chase Special Taxing District, 424 So. 2d 787, 790 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 436 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1983), and the Second District
in Thomas v. State, 422 So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
328. Thomason, 620 So. 2d at 1236.
329. The case was reviewed pursuant to a certified question relating to the merits. Id.
at 1235. The issue relating to the prior prohibition proceeding was not presented to the court.
330. 605 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1992).
331. Id.
332. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.1 10(g) provides that an appellee may cross
appeal by serving a notice within 10 days of service of the appellant's notice or within the
time allowed for the filing of a notice of appeal directed to the order to be reviewed,
whichever is. later. FLA. R. APP. PROC. 9.110(g).
333. Peltz, 605 So. 2d at 865.
334. Id. at 866.
335. Id
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G. Nature of Review
Many cases dealt with the question of whether orders were reviewable,
either by appeal or by certiorari. The sheer volume of cases involving such
issues precludes discussion of the reasoning relied on each case. Nonethe-
less, this article will set forth some of the cases, and indicate the type of
order involved, and the conclusion reached.
1. Cases in Which Review by Appeal was
Found to be Appropriate
Among the orders that were reviewed by appeal were: (1) an order
dismissing a civil action without prejudice because of a plaintiff's failure to
serve the complaint within 120 days after it was filed;336 (2) an order in
a prosecution for driving under the influence suppressing breath test results
because the breath testing device was not maintained in compliance with the
appropriate regulations;337 (3) an order dismissing a petition for a writ of
mandamus;33 (4) an adjudicatory order which reaffirmed a dependency
finding and which terminated the parental rights of the natural father;339
(5) an order granting a motion for summary final judgment on a permanent
injunction; 34° (6) a non-final order denying immunity under the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act;34' (7) an order denying a motion
to set aside a clerk's default; 342 and (8) an order compelling compliance
with an investigative subpoena served by the Attorney General of Flori-
da.343
2. Cases in Which Review by Appeal was
Found to be Inappropriate
Orders which were found not to be reviewable by appeal included: (1)
336. Carlton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
337. Blore v. Fierro, 618 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (conflict certified
with State v. Gemignani, 545 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Townsend,
479 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
338. Tunstall v. Folsom, 616 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
339. In re T.M., 614 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
340. Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass'n, 614 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
341. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988); International Ship Repair & Marine Servs., Inc. v.
Emig, 611 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
342. Richardson v. Watson, 611 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
343. Transcall Am., Inc. v. Butterworth, 604 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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non-final orders in child dependency proceedings; 44 (2) a partial summary
judgment establishing the existence of insurance coverage; 34 5 (3) an order
vacating an arbitration award and ordering a new hearing before a new
arbitrator; 346 (4) an order granting a motion for final summary judgment
on attorney's fees; 347 (5) an order granting a defendant's cross-motion for
partial summary judgment, denying a plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment and reserving jurisdiction for any and all other matters applicable
to the case;34 and (6) orders impleading a third party prior to the entry of
a final order against the impleaded third party.349
3. Cases in Which Review by Appeal was Found to be
Inappropriate but in Which Review by
Certiorari was Found to be Appropriate
In some cases, the courts found that orders were not appealable, but
that certiorari review was proper. The orders involved in these cases
included: (1) an order denying a motion to mitigate a sentence in a situation
in which the trial court erroneously believed that it was without jurisdiction
to consider the motion;350 (2) a writ of prohibition by a circuit court to a
county court ordering a defendant in a criminal case discharged on speedy
trial grounds;35' (3) an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and certifying
a juvenile for trial as an adult; 352 (4) an order suppressing identification
testimony in a criminal prosecution; 353 (5) a final judgment of foreclosure
in a case in which the appellant's counterclaim asserting fraud had been
severed and was still pending in the trial court;354 (6) an order to show
cause why a writ of prohibition should not be granted in a situation in
which, absent immediate review a party might have suffered irreparable
344. In re MA., 609 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1992).
345. Interamerican Car Rental, Inc. v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
346. Central Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Orlando, 614 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
347. Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass'n, 614 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 199:3).
348. Dixon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 609 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
349. Turnpike Dev., Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 606 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
350. Arnold v. State, 621 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
351. State v. Frazee, 617 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
352. In re D.W., 616 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
353. State v. Houston, 616 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
354. Norris v. Paps, 615 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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harm for which remedy on plenary appeal was inadequate;355 (7) an order
abating an action for exhaustion of administrative remedies; a56 (8) an order
granting a psychiatric examination of children entered after final judgment
but as part of a supplementary proceeding on a petition for change of
custody;357 and (9) an order withholding adjudication of guilt and impos-
ing court costs that did not place the defendant on probation.358
4. Cases in Which Certiorari Review was
Found to be Appropriate
In addition to those noted in the preceding section of this article,
certiorari was deemed the proper method to review numerous other orders,
such as: (1) an order requiring production and in camera inspection of
certain investigative reports of Florida's Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services;359 (2) an order entered on a master's report prior
to the expiration of the ten day period under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.490(h) for serving exceptions to the report;36 ° (3) a protective order
allowing a plaintiff, but not a defendant, to communicate exparte with the
defendant's former employees;36' (4) an order compelling disclosure of the
petitioner's workers' compensation file on the respondent;362 (5) an order
imposing sanctions in the form of attorney's fees and costs for failure to
negotiate in good faith during court ordered mediation; 363 (6) an order
compelling the victim of a criminal offense to appear at a live lineup and
identify the person who committed the offense upon her;364 (7) an order
reducing a sentence upon a defendant's motion to mitigate sentence entered
after the trial court lost jurisdiction to reduce or modify the sentence;365
355. Broward County v. Florida Nat'l Properties, 613 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
356. Hedin v. Indian River County, 610 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
357. Pariser v. Pariser, 601 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
354. Martin v. State, 600 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
359. Cebrian By and Through Cebrian v. Klein, 614 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
360. Barnett Bank of Martin County v. RGA Dev. Co., 606 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
361. Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc. v. Keiser, 611 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
362. Adjustco, Inc. v. Sibley, 611 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
363. Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
364. State v. Ray, 604 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d
8 (Fla. 1992).
365. State v. Blue, 603 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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and (8) an order denying a motion to amend and/or supplement a motion for
post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850.366
IV. CERTIFICATION
A major development in the field of appellate practice in Florida was
the approval by the supreme court of board certification for appellate
lawyers.367 The rule adopted by the court368 on the subject defines
''appellate practice" as "the practice of law dealing with the recognition and
preservation of error committed by lower tribunals, and the presentation of
argument concerning the presence or absence of such error to state or
federal appellate courts through brief writing, writ and motion practice, and
oral argument. 3 69  They go on to state that appellate practice "includes
evaluation and consultation regarding potential appellate issues or remedies
in connection with proceedings in the lower tribunal prior to the initiation
of the appellate process."37
To become certified as an appellate lawyer, an applicant must
demonstrate substantial involvement in appellate practice,37" ' a showing
which requires meeting several criteria,"' including five years of the
actual practice of law, at least thirty percent of which has involved appellate
practice; 37 3 having sole or primary responsibility in at least twenty-five
appellate actions for the filing of principal briefs in appeals or petitions or
responses in extraordinary writ cases; 374 having sole or primary responsi-
bility for at least five oral arguments;375 and a demonstration of special
competence as an appellate lawyer within the three years immediately
preceding application.376
366. Rozier v. State, 603 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
367. The Fla. Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar, 621 So. 2d 1032
(Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Florida Bar Amendments].
368. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 6-13.2 (1987).
369. Florida Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1059-60.
370. Id. at 1060.
371. Id.
372. While this article will summarize the criteria, it does not purport to set forth the
criteria in detail. Attorneys interested in applying for certification should review the rule
itself and not rely on this summary as a complete statement of the criteria.
373. Id.
374. Id
375. Florida Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1060.
376. Id.
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In addition, applicants must submit the names of at least four lawyers
and three judges to attest to their substantial involvement in appellate
practice,377 demonstrate that within the three years immediately preceding
application, they have accumulated approved continuing legal education
credits in the field of appellate practice in amounts varying from thirty to
forty-five hours depending upon when application is made,378 and pass an
examination.379
The rule also establishes the requirements for recertification, which,
with the exception of the examination, are concerned with the same factors
as the requirements for initial certification.38 °
It is hoped that the certification process will "identify those lawyers
who engage in appellate practice and have the special knowledge, skills, and
proficiency to be properly identified to the public as certified appellate
lawyers." ''
V. CONCLUSION
The changes that have occurred in Florida over the past year in the
field of appellate practice have been widespread and significant. They
include not only the large number of court decisions that are expected each
year, but also important changes to the rules and the birth of certification.
These events will undoubtedly shape the future of appellate practice in this
state. The recent creation by The Florida Bar of its Appellate Practice and
Advocacy Section will also impact on that future. The net result of these
developments should be a better appellate process.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Florida Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1061.
381. Id. at 1059.
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